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Abstract 
 
We examine the international distribution of expenditures for the provision of 
a global, long-term and uncertain public goods from the point of view of a 
benevolent planner. Even assuming a “no-redistribution” constraint, first period 
expenditures are in general progressive with income, and independent both from 
total level of action, and from future distribution of damages. However, in 
status-quo mandates—where current negotiating powers shape both present and 
future allocation—future distributions of efforts are very unequal, and 
agreement, if any, is at high risk of instability. An adaptative mandate proves 
necessary to provide an acceptable solution. 
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1. Introduction 
Providing transnational, long-term and uncertain public goods such as 
the ozone layer, biodiversity or climate confronts inter and intra 
generational distributional issues simultaneously. The economic 
literature addressed this issue (Sandler, 2001), in particular through 
extending the Bowen-Lindhal-Samuelson (BLS) conditions to the 
intergenerational case (Sandler and Smith, 1976). However, the history 
of climate policies shows that negotiations still rely on rhetorics based 
on pure ethical intuitions such as common but differentiated 
responsibilities, per capita distribution of emission rights (Agarwal and 
Narain, 1991), or the grandfathering scheme. Two actors of this 
negotiation from both sides of the Atlantic (Bodansky 2001, Hourcade 
2002) show how the reluctance of putting some economic insights in 
the discussion made it difficult to control the political vagaries of the 
process and to find a ground to reconcile opposite views. 
Economists may be in part responsible for this lack of influence 
because of their reflex to keep ethics separated from economics. This 
paper builds on follow the opposite advice that “there is something in 
the methods standardly used in economics, related inter alia with its 
engineering aspect, that can be of use to modern ethics as well” (A. Sen 1987, 
p.9). To do so, using climate as an empirical case, it interprets the 
benevolent planner metaphor as capturing the behavior of the 
chairman of a Conference of the Parties1 presenting a take or leave 
proposal in the final hours of the negotiation (Grubb et al., 1999).  
Using a two period framework, we define four mandates that can 
be given to the planner; these mandates combine assumptions about: 
- diplomatic attitudes: we distinguish a status-quo approach, 
whereby current balances of power are used to shape long-term 
policy, and an adaptative approach whereby evolutions in the 
distribution of economic income and power are recognized; 
                                                 
1
 The COP is the negotiating body of the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC). 
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- visions of intergenerational solidarity in the face of climate risks: 
we distinguish between dynastic solidarity, whereby Parties are 
concerned by the welfare of their future citizens only, and universal 
solidarity, whereby Parties consider the welfare of all future 
individuals, regardless of where they live. 
These mandates are analyzed under a no redistribution constraint 
because countries are not likely to let climate policies—or any other 
international treaty of that sort—be the occasion of large-scale wealth 
redistribution across nations. We first focus on the burden sharing 
principles which emerge from these mandates, and on their political 
viability. We then examine their implications for the level of provision 
of the public good. At each step, we analyze the specific role of 
uncertainty. Finally, we derive conclusions for the future of regimes 
apt to manage global and future public goods in an unequal word. 
2. A Generic Model with Three Alternative Programs 
Let us start from a generic model similar to the one developed by 
Sandler and Smith (1976). The world is divided in N countries, and 
there are two periods, present and future, the latter indexed by 
superscript f. At first period, the representative individual2 of the li 
inhabitants of country i allocates his revenue yi between ci the 
consumption of a composite private good chosen as numeraire, and ai 
his abatement expenses. 
yi = ci + ai (1) 
Let x (resp. xf) be the amount of greenhouse gases emissions 
(GHGs) abated worldwide compared to business-as-usual. We use 
x+xf as an index of the climate change stock externality,3 and denote 
di(x+xf) the per capita level of damages incurred in country i at second 
period. Since x+xf aggregates avoided tons of GHGs, functions di(.) are 
decreasing. Thus, second period budget equations are as follows. 
                                                 
2
 We will not address the internal distribution of revenue in each country. 
3
 This (inversed) index is a simplification of the dynamics of GHG accumulation in the 
atmosphere, but it suffices in capturing the stock externality character of climate change.  
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yif - di(x+xf) = cif + aif (2) 
We assume that abatement expenses are used efficiently and denote 
C(x) (resp. Cf(xf)) the worldwide abatement cost function, and the total 
level of abatement at each period is thus given by:4 
∑
i
 li ai = C(x)          ∑
i
 lif aif = Cf(xf) (3) 
At the beginning of the first period, the planner/chairman of the 
COP is charged with proposing an abatement level for each country at 
both periods. This one-shot model is arguably at odds with the 
sequential nature of the real climate regime, where targets are set for 
five-year periods only. But, climate change being a stock externality, 
the planner cannot but make assumptions about future action when 
computing present one; second period abatements can thus be 
interpreted as plans which may, or may not, be carried out (section 4). 
To draft a proposal with reasonable chances of being accepted, the 
planner maximizes a collective welfare function W = Σ li αi Ui(.), 
which is a weighted sum of the representative individuals’ utilities, 
and he specifies W and selects weights αi in function of the mandate 
he receives from the Parties. If we assume, despite its controversial 
character from an ethical point of view,5 that wealthiest Parties impose 
a no-redistribution constraint, then this collective welfare function 
must meet the following two technical conditions. 
 - national contributions ai and aif must be non negative, as no Party 
will accept to abate more in order to endow another Party with 
                                                 
4
 Let xi be the country abatement levels, and Ci(xi) the national abatement cost functions. 
Then C(x) = Min {∑
i
 Ci(xi)  ∑
i
 xi = x}. This can be interpreted as a carbon fund 
provisioned by all countries and which reduces emissions where it is cheapest to do so. 
5
 See Azar (1999, p.254): “The global welfare function is a normative, not an empirical 
question, and few would contest that the world would actually be a much better place if 
the huge differences income were reduced. A situation where the richest billion people 
live in abundance, and the poorest billion suffer from chronicle hunger, can by no 
reasonable standards be considered a global welfare maximum.” 
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emissions rights higher than its baseline prior to any carbon trading6. 
This condition is seemingly trivial but we will show that it plays a role 
at the second period equilibrium. 
 - Second, the weights of the representative individuals must be 
such that the initial distribution of wealth (yi) is welfare maximizing.7 
Negishi (1960) tells us that these weights are unique—up to a scale 
factor—and equal to the inverse of the marginal utility of initial 
revenues. If utility functions are logarithmic and if first and second 
period consumption are separable, these weights are proportional to 
per capita revenues.8  
However, the set of welfare functions which meet these restrictions 
is still rather large because there are various ways of interpreting the 
no redistribution imperative at the second period and various 
attitudes vis-à-vis climate damages. 
With regard to the no redistribution constraint, modelers (e.g., 
Nordhaus and Yang, 1996) often consider that it applies separately at 
each period. The Negishi weights are thus made time-varying so that 
the projected distribution of income (yif) is welfare maximizing at 
second period. But, by doing so, one makes a strong assumption about 
the political economy of the negotiation, namely that Parties agree to 
ask the planner to anticipate changes in income distribution. In other 
words, this presupposes a consensus on the legitimacy or the 
ineluctability of changes in economic balances, which contradicts 
diplomatic traditions where negotiating powers are governed by 
prevailing balances of power. 
It is not implausible that Machiavelli’s qualification of States as 
“cold monsters” will remain valid in the 21st century. The richest 
                                                 
6
 The excess quota allocated to Russia and Ukraine by the Kyoto Protocol is obviously a 
pure tactical concession. In a milder approach no Party shall benefit from climate policy 
as a whole; thus the sum of contribution and damages shall be non negative (ai
f
+ di
f
 >0). 
7
 To avoid any misunderstanding, let us make clear that this technical trick capturing 
political constraints does not imply a substantive value judgment on the equity of current 
state of the world.  
8
 Were these weights all set to 1, total income should be redistributed so as to achieve 
equal per capita revenue. 
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countries may well not accept the ineluctable decline of their share in 
world’s wealth, or may at least tend to use their current superiority to 
slow down this decline. They may then be tempted by a status-quo 
mandate, whereby they force the planner to calibrate the collective 
welfare function at both periods based on current income distribution. 
Regarding the interplay between the assessment of climate 
damages and intergenerational equity, two polar attitudes are again 
possible. The first derives from the observation that negotiating team, 
defending national interests and speaking on behalf of both its present 
and unborn fellow citizens, tends to follow a dynastic solidarity 
conduct and primarily considers the damages falling on their own 
country. A polar option, expressed by many NGOs, is that decision-
makers should adopt a universal solidarity ethic, and should be 
concerned by the welfare of all future individuals, regardless of where 
they live, and of where damages fall.9 This alternative can be 
translated analytically by making second period utilities dependent, 
or not, on damages in other countries. 
Four possible programs can be derived by combining these two sets 
of hypothesis. If we denote αi and βi the first and second period 
weights respectively,10 and ϕ the utility discount factor,11 they are:12 
 - “Dynastic solidarity” and “status-quo” mandate: 
W = ∑
i
 li αi Ui(ci) + ϕ ∑
i
 lif αi Uif(cif) (4) 
αi = 
α
Ui'(yi)
                                                   with α = 



∑
i
 
li
Ui'(yi)
 -1
  (5) 
 - “Dynastic solidarity” and “anticipative” mandate 
                                                 
9
 We will discuss later the ethical rationale and political likelihood of this mandate. For 
the time being, we treat it as a pure logical possibility. 
10
 We assume that the sum of weights over all country is equal to one. 
11
 We assume here that all Parties have the same pure time preference. This still allows 
for differentiated discount rates across countries, as utility functions and growth rates 
might differ. 
12
 Present and future consumptions are always assumed separable. 
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W = ∑
i
 li αi Ui(ci) + ϕ ∑
i
 lif βi Uif (cif) (6) 
αi = 
α
Ui'(yi)
                                                   with α = 



∑
i
 
li
Ui'(yi)
 -1
 (7) 
βi = βUi f'(yif)                                                 with β = 


∑
i
 
lif
U if'(yif)
 -1
  (8) 
 - “Universal solidarity” mandates are obtained by substituting  
Uif (cif, d1f,…,di-1f ,di+1f ,…,dNf ) to Uif(cif) in equations (4) and (6) respectively. 
The damages falling on other countries, in addition to those falling on 
the country i are thus included in the calculation of cif. 
3. Burden Sharing at First Period: Towards an Easy Rule 
of Thumb? 
In all four mandates, solving the planner’s program yields the same 
result at first period: abatement expenses should be allocated so as to 
equate after abatement weighted marginal utilities of consumption 
across countries (see Appendix 1 for full derivation of the result) 
which expresses the BLS condition in the context of our model. 
α1 U1' (y1-a1) = … = αN UN' (yN-aN) (9) 
Since, by virtue of the no redistribution constraint, before 
abatement weighted marginal utilities are also equal, the optimal 
distribution of abatement costs decreases the weighted marginal 
utilities by the same amount. 
α1 U1' (y1) - α1 U1' (y1-a1)  = … = αN UN' (yN) - αN UN' (yN-aN) (10) 
Figure 1 provides a geometric illustration of this result, picturing 
two regions differing only in income. Since preferences are the same, 
the poor region has a higher marginal utility of consumption (B) than 
the rich one (A). To comply with the no redistribution constraint, the 
planner chooses αpoor (normalizing αrich to 1) such that the weighted 
marginal utilities of consumption in both regions are equal in the no-
policy scenario. The weighted marginal utility of the poor region is 
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thus C instead of B. To preserve this equality in the post abatement 
equilibrium, it suffices to find the horizontal line intersecting with 
both the marginal utility function of the rich (continuous line) and the 
weighted marginal utility function of the poor (dotted line), such that 
apoor+arich is equal to the total desired level of abatement. 
Contribution apoor is lower than arich if the slope of the weighted 
marginal utility function is steeper at point C than the slope of the 
marginal utility function is at point A. This occurs when the ratio of 
the slope of the non weighted utility function in B and A is higher than 
the ratio of marginal utilities between B and A. An analytic condition 
can be easily derived when contributions ai are all assumed to remain 
small compared with initial revenues yi. In that case, equation (10) can 
be approximated by: 
-
U"
U'(ypoor) apoor ≈ -
U"
U'(yrich) arich (11) 
In other words, for all ypoor < yrich 
apoor < arich   if and only if   -
U"
U'(ypoor) > -
U"
U'(yrich) (12) 
The latter condition holds (see Appendix 3) for a large class of 
utility functions, in particular with logarithmic utility functions U = 
ln(c), and exponential utility functions U = ca (0<a<1)  since - 
U"
U' = 
1
c. 
With such functions, optimal abatement expenditures are proportional 
to per capita revenues: if the average European is 46 times richer than 
the average Indian,13 then each European should contribute 46 times 
more to climate mitigation, in absolute terms, than the average Indian. 
However, by construction of the weights, their utility loss is identical. 
This has four policy implications for the first period. First, all 
countries should contribute to climate mitigation. Second 
contributions are in general progressive with and proportional to 
income. Interestingly, while grounded on conservative assumptions 
regarding income distribution, this outcome might be consistent with 
                                                 
13
 Based on 2000 Gross National Income, as reported in World Bank, 2002. 
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the “common but differentiated responsibilities” principle of the 
UNFCCC. Third, this burden sharing rule—at least as long as 
contributions remain small with regard to initial revenues—is 
independent from both the optimal level of public good (x+xf), and 
from the first period emissions level x. Last, it is entirely independent 
from the distribution of the impacts of climate change, and thus robust 
to their uncertainty (see Appendix 2) since it depends only on first-
period utilities and income level. 
In sum, regardless of the mandate, intra-generational equity at first 
period can be addressed using a simple “rule of thumb” based on 
observable parameters and can be separated from the controversies 
about intergenerational distribution and the abatement targets.  
4. Burden Sharing at the Second Period: when Mandate 
Matters 
We now turn on to burden sharing at second period. The core of this 
section is analytical, but numerical exercises with two regions, 
developed and developing, illustrate our findings and provide the 
orders of magnitude of the parameters at stake. 
4.1. The Status-Quo – Dynastic Mandate at Risk of Instability 
Under the status-quo – dynastic mandate, burden sharing at second 
period is governed, like in the first, by the equalization of weighted 
marginal utilities of consumption: 
α1 U1 f ' (y1f-d1
f(x+xf)-a1
f) = … = αN UNf ' (yNf -dNf (x+xf)-aNf ) (13) 
The resulting distribution of abatement costs, however, is 
dramatically different. This is in part due to the fact that both damages 
and abatement expenses enter in (13). But the main reason is that, 
since the αi are calibrated on first period incomes, the vector yif has no 
reason to be welfare maximizing. And in most instances it is not. 
Figure 2 shows what happens in this case (assuming that damages 
remain small compared to revenues). If before abatement weighted 
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marginal utilities differ, then the optimal plan consists in charging all 
abatement expenditures to the country with the lowest weighted 
marginal utility. The planner shall do so until abatement costs raise 
the weighted marginal utility of this country enough to equate the 
level of the second in rank, at which point both are charged; and so on 
until all abatement expenditures are covered. 
If utility functions Ui and Uif are identical, the country with the 
lowest weighted marginal utility before abatement at second period is 
the poorest country (see Appendix 4). Since developing countries are 
projected to experience higher growth rates than developed 
economies in the coming decades (Nakićenović and Swart, 2000, 
World Bank, 2003), this leads to a paradoxical outcome; let us assume, 
for instance, that the poor region grow by 3.0% annually over the next 
decade, and the rich region by 2.5%. In this scenario, the former would 
be about 5% richer in 2010 than it would be under a 2.5% growth rate. 
This “extra growth” represents 1% of the world gross product in 2010; 
then all the effort should fall on the poor region as long as annualized 
abatement costs over this period is lower than that amount. 
This result cannot be reversed when accounting for climate 
damages, even though they are expected to be higher in the 
developing world (McCarthy et al., 2001). If we assume—fairly 
conservatively—that per capita GDP growth of the developing world 
is half a point higher than this of developed countries during the next 
50 years, then per capita GDP in 2050 is 27% higher in the developing 
world than it would have been had both rates been equal. Regional 
damages apt to rip off this “overgrowth” are beyond the most 
pessimistic expectations about damages, small Island-States and Sub 
Saharan Africa excepted. 
In sum, under this mandate, large countries such as China, India, 
Brazil, or Mexico would be called to pay most of the abatement 
expenditures at second period, even if they are expected to suffer from 
higher damages than the developed world. Factoring uncertainty in 
complicates the problem but does not change its logic. 
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This result looks so unacceptable by developing countries that one 
cannot but question the policy relevance of the underlying model. Its 
main weakness is that it features only two periods; even though our 
numerical examples demonstrate that introducing shorter time 
periods would not fundamentally change the substance of the issue, 
one could argue that, in the real decision-making process, Parties 
agree only on the first period expenses, and that the second period 
distribution plan can be renegotiated. 
This is true; however our result points out the outcome of a 
situation in which the structure of the first period decision has long-
term impacts. Examples abound of long-lasting arrangements built on 
relative bargaining powers which have dramatically changed since 
then. The composition of the U.N. Security Council and the voting 
system within the U.S. are two outstanding examples. In the climate 
policy context, limits to renegotiating allocation rules come from the 
very cornerstone of the Kyoto regime, that is an international carbon 
trading system. Its dynamic efficiency would indeed be undermined 
were the entry of new countries not controlled by predefined quota 
allocation rules, and were some degree of certainty not given to 
governments and private agents over future levels of their carbon 
constraint. Changing the rules too drastically, or too often, might lead 
agents to refrain from using emissions trading (OECD, 1993). 
Moreover, an interpretation of the status-quo – dynastic mandate is 
that it expands the rationale of the grandfathering principle to future 
generations. Indirectly, equation (13) comes to endowing the future 
inhabitants of the rich countries with emissions rights in part based on 
those acquired by their predecessors. Viewed in that light, the no 
redistribution constraint comes to repeated grandfathering; it is 
consistent with the claim that “the U.S. lifestyle is not negotiable.”14 
At first period, grandfathering is legitimated by the fact that vested 
interests need to be compensated for the modification of the social 
contract from a situation without to a situation with carbon constraint. 
                                                 
14
 Even though this is a quote from a former U.S. President, it is fair to note that it would 
probably be endorsed in many quarters of the developed world. 
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This ground is not valid in the long-run any longer, which explains 
the repeated warning by the G77 and China that “there would be no 
agreement on carbon trading until the question of emissions rights and 
entitlements is addressed equitably.”15 
Under the status-quo – dynastic mandate, two main outcomes are 
thus possible: either the chairman’s proposal is immediately rejected 
by the fastest growing countries or it is accepted at first period, but 
generates tensions at the second and strong incentives to defect.  
4.2. Winner-Losers Dilemma in the Adaptative – Dynastic 
Mandate 
Under an adaptative – dynastic mandate, burden sharing at second 
period is again governed by the equalization of weighted marginal 
abatement utilities. 
β1 U1  f ' (y1f-d1f(x+xf)-a1f) = … = βN UN  f '  (yNf -dNf (x+xf)-aNf ) (14) 
But weights βi now reflect the baseline distribution of wealth at 
second period, and “before climate” weighted marginal utilities are 
thus equal. We recover the results obtained in section 3, but they now 
apply to the total of abatement expenditures plus damages: with 
logarithmic functions, each country should entail a climate change bill 
in proportion to its per capita GDP. 
Hence, abatement expenditures depend not only on the before 
abatement distribution of wealth, but also on the distribution of 
residual climate change damages. Let us illustrate with developed (N) 
and developing region (S). N and S, we assume, share the same 
logarithmic utility functions, but their first period per capita revenue 
differ by a factor 23. Higher per capita GDP growth in S from first to 
second period (3% vs. 2.5%), reduces this range from 1 to 18 in 2050. 
But in that period, the population of S has increased by 40% while the 
population of N has remained constant. Abatement costs are slightly 
                                                 
15 UNFCCC document SB/1998/MISC.1/Add.3/Rev.1 Preparatory work for the fourth 
session of the Conference of the Parties on the items listed in decision 1/CP.3, paragraph 
5, Indonesia (on behalf of the Group of 77 and China). 
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higher in N than in S. Last, marginal damages are assumed quadratic 
with net emissions, but we test several assumptions on the share of 
second-period revenue that full damages (without abatement) would 
cause (see Appendix 5 for details). 
In scenario a (see Table 1) damages without any abatement 
represent 5% of baseline revenues in both regions. Abatement 
expenditures are then allocated proportionally to per capita revenue. 
In scenario b, residual damages are 6% of the GDP/cap in S and 4% in 
N. Country N is then demanded to devote to abatement a higher share 
of its revenue than S so that the total climate bill (once residual 
damages are added) is the same in both countries. In scenario c, S is so 
impacted that it should not pay anything for abatement. In scenario d, 
damages are so high in S, that even with zero abatement expenditures, 
S still support a higher climate bill than N. The non-redistribution 
constraint anorthf  ≥ 0 is binding, preventing the planner from 
transferring additional money from N to S to compensate for the extra 
damages.  
In the latter situation, which is far from implausible for Sub-
Saharan Africa or small Island-States, the no redistribution constraint 
is put to a serious test. Direct compensations for excess damages can 
only be paid if Parties make a more lenient interpretation whereby it 
applies to the sum of damages and abatement expenditures. 
More generally, the main difficulty of this mandate stems from the 
very fact that damages will remain difficult to observe, quantify and 
compare across countries. Projections of average increase of 
temperature by global circulation models have indeed a higher degree 
of confidence than projections at a local scale, and uncertainty grows 
by orders of magnitude when translating local physical impacts to 
economic damages (McCarthy et al., 2001): Western Europe may 
experience either a 2°C warming or a several degrees cooling 
depending upon the evolution of the North-Atlantic thermohaline 
circulation; Russia can be counted amongst the winners of global 
warming, unless the melting of the permafrost or the difficult 
adaptation of vegetation prove to be dramatic. 
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As demonstrated by Table n°1, only small divergences in climate 
damages significantly alter the allocation of abatement expenditures. 
Thus there are risks of non acceptation of the proposed deal (all 
Parties are interested in inflating their estimates in order to minimize 
their contribution to abatement expenditures and increasing their β) or 
of important the gap between expected and realized damages, which 
would imply important changes in the initial agreement. 
4.3. Universal Solidarity Mandates: More Robust to Uncertainty?  
The “dynastic solidarity” mandates are based on the premise that 
Parties are primarily interested in the fate of their own descendants.  
This premise seems consistent with dominant diplomatic conducts. 
However, alternative “universal solidarity” mandate— in which 
Parties consider all damages wherever they fall—can also be justified; 
even without adopting a universal bonhomie attitude. A first argument 
stems from Thomas Schelling’s suggestion (1995) that, beyond some 
horizon, all individuals are indistinct16; a second stems from a 
reconsideration of pure self interests. Faced with tremendous 
uncertainties regarding the regional distribution of climate damages 
and related economic consequences, Parties might refrain from 
indulging themselves in the camp of the winners 17. In addition, given 
the risks of propagation of local shocks—, increased economical and 
political instability accelerated migration —18, Parties might consider 
that any important impact anywhere will ultimately affect everyone’s 
welfare and security.19 
A status-quo – universal solidarity mandate makes thus sense even 
under selfish attitude. But, in terms of allocation of abatement costs, it 
                                                 
16
 The same intuition underlies the proposal of an hyperbolic discount rate. 
17
 A situation analogous to the “veil of ignorance” described by John Rawls (1971). 
18
 This is all the more important since adverse climate impacts may fall disproportionally 
on fragile regions in developing countries. 
19
 The concept of solidarity can thus be understood in its etymological sense: solidus: 
compact and hence ‘solid’; it means with whom we consider to be bound either for 
reasons of benevolence or because our interests stick together. 
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confronts the same difficulties as the status-quo dynastic mandate and 
the fact that damages are now universally accounted does not solve 
the second-period allocation problem, as growth differentials still 
exist.  
In an adaptative – universal solidarity mandate, the distribution of 
contributions at both periods is governed by the same principle as in 
the adaptative – dynastic solidarity case. The main difference concerns 
the treatment of damages. A low impacted country will indeed 
consider, at least in part, damages falling on other countries. This has 
two main consequences. First, the total level of damages considered by 
parties increases compared to the dynastic case because, on top of 
national damages, damages abroad also matter. Second, the 
uncertainty on the distribution of damages—at constant global 
marginal damage—plays a lesser role. If a common diagnosis can be 
reached on the magnitude of marginal damages at global level, then 
uncertainty at local level matter far less as an obstacle to a burden 
sharing agreement. 
5. Levels of Abatement 
Let us now turn to the consequences of the four mandates on the 
provision of public goods. To do so, we will illustrate the 
consequences of the analytical solutions of the planner’s problems (see 
Appendix 1 for complete derivation) with “North-South” numerical 
example developed above. 
Abatement is governed by equations (15) and (16). They establish 
that the public good should be provided up to the point where its 
marginal cost matches the sum of the willingness to pay of all parties 
involved. This is identical to the BLS condition in the one period 
model, with the only difference that, at first period, one has to 
compare the marginal utility of public good consumption tomorrow, 
with the marginal utility of private good consumption today. 
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C’(x) = - ϕ ∑
i
 lif 
βi
αi
 
U if'(yif-aif-di(x+xf))
Ui' (yi-ai)
 di'(x+xf)   
                                                  - ϕ ∑
i
 lif 
βi
αi
 ∑
j≠i
 
∂Uif/∂dj
Ui' (yi-ai)
 dj'(x+xf) (15) 
Cf’(xf) = - ∑
i
 lif πi di'(x+xf) - ∑
i
 lif πi ∑
j≠i
 
∂Uif
∂dj  dj
'(x+xf)    with πi ≥ 1 (16) 
In both equations, the first terms are common to all mandates, 
while the second are specific to universal solidarity. We leave it aside 
for now and start with the adaptative – dynastic case. 
Coefficients πi in equation (16) are ratios between the weighted 
marginal utility of consumption and the shadow price of abatement at 
second period.  When all contributions aif are strictly positive—i.e., 
when no country suffers too high damages relative to others—the 
shadow price of abatement is exactly equal to weighted marginal 
utility of consumptions in all countries, and weights πi are equal to 
one. Hence: 
C’(x) = - ρ ∑
i
 lif di'(x+xf)  (17) 
Cf’(xf) = - ∑
i
 lif di'(x+xf)  (18) 
Equations (17) and (18) tell us that the only element that matters to 
determine the level of effort in this case is the world-aggregate 
marginal damage function ∑
i
 lifdi'( ). 
Weights αi or βi, on the other hand, do not play a role in setting the 
absolute level of action (although they are critical for the distribution 
of expenses, as we’ve seen above). This supports the previous findings 
that the debates on absolute level of action and on the distribution of 
abatement expenditures can be separated at first period. Relatedly, the 
optimal level of effort does not depend on the distribution of damages. 
If country-level damages functions change, while the world aggregate 
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function remains the same, the optimal provision of public goods 
remains unchanged. 
However, (17) and (18) are valid only as long as damages in poor 
countries are not too high to drop second-period expenditure aif down 
to zero. Otherwise, the weighted marginal utility of consumption in 
these countries remains higher than the shadow price of abatement, 
and weights πi in these countries are greater than unity. In that case, 
the optimal level of action is higher, as the planner puts a premium on 
the damages of the most affected countries. 
Numerical simulations (Table 2) suggest however that the 
variations of level of effort remain modest. At given world aggregate 
marginal damage function in all scenarios, we allocate more and more 
of those damages to region S. However, even in the extreme case (f) 
where damages could wipe up to 12% of revenues in S, against only 
2.1% in N, the optimal emission level is up by less than 0.1% 
compared with the case where both N and S could see 5% of their 
revenues impacted (scenario a). The intuition behind these results is 
that, although damages in S are very high relative to N, the evolution 
of the marginal utility of consumption, which drives the value of 
weight πi in S, has a much higher inertia. 
How do abatement levels compare in other mandates relative to 
this mandate? In the status-quo dynastic mandate, total abatement is 
higher than in the adaptative – dynastic mandate; first period 
abatement remains virtually unchanged, but second-period abatement 
rises. The reason is that, in this case, weights πi have the opposite 
behavior than in the adaptative dynastic case: they are equal to one in 
the countries which end up paying all the abatement expenditures 
(developing countries), while they are greater than one for the others. 
This raises the total abatement at second period. However, first-period 
abatement remains virtually unchanged because the implicit discount 
rate between periods retained by the planner rises as some countries 
have “overgrowth” compared with the others. For example, keeping 
the same assumptions as in the paragraph above, the optimal 
abatement in this mandate is 44% against 43% in the adaptative 
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dynastic case. First period abatement decreases by 1% (from 7% to 6%) 
while second period abatement increases from 53% to 55%. 
Last, in the adaptative – universal mandate, the volume of 
abatement also rises. As equations (15) and (16) illustrate, for each 
level of concentration, and everything else equal, total damages are 
higher by virtue of the cross-country impacts.20 The extent to which 
abatement level increases depends entirely on the specifications of the 
second-period utilities of the cross-country impacts. 
To illustrate, let us assume damages are such that they could wipe 
up to 2% of the baseline GDP in region N, against 8% in S, and let us 
compare the adaptative-dynastic case—where all utitilies are 
logarithmic in local consumption—to the adaptative-universal case 
where second-period utilities are multiplied by a factor which 
depends on total damages. This factor is unity when damages are 
zero, and it increases linearly with total damages, to culminate at 0.99 
(a 1% loss of utility) when damages are maximal. In the dynastic 
setting, the optimal abatement level—on average across both 
periods—is 33%, and it climbs to 45% in the universal case. 
6. Conclusion 
The advice that "equity and efficiency should be separated" in global 
environmental issues (Arrow et al. 1996) is both in accordance with 
one basic principle retained in conventional analysis of environmental 
policies and a way of dissociating the selection of a given level of 
public good from the regressum ad infinitum of ethical controversies 
induced by any burden sharing negotiation (Hourcade, 1994). This 
position had been questioned under the argument that the second 
theorem of welfare does not hold for a privately produced public good 
since of all the possible ways of distributing a given total of emissions 
rights, very few are compatible with efficient markets (Chichilnisky et 
                                                 
20
 We do not consider the possibility here that some countries may benefit from climate 
change impacts in others. 
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al., 2000). Chao and Peck (2000) responded that this point was 
numerically of second order in the case of climate change. 
This paper comes back to the non orthogonality between equity and 
efficiency starting from another angle which may have significant 
implications. We show that, even under a no redistribution constraint 
and for a given pure preference for the present, the provision of public 
good and the optimal distribution of abatement expenditures are 
governed by a) whether Parties stick or not to the diplomatic reflex of 
using current balances of power to shape future agreements (status-
quo versus adaptative mandate) b) the way in which they envisage 
their solidarity with future generations (dynastic versus universal). 
The first period allocation of abatement expenditures should be 
governed by the same BLS like principle regardless of the mandate; it 
is progressive with income for a wide range of utility functions and 
independent from both the global level of action and the second 
period distribution of damages. But, for the same expectations about 
climate damages, the first period abatement is far lower in the status 
quo – dynastic mandate  than in the adaptative-universal solidarity 
mandate. 
At the second period, status quo mandates lead to the paradoxical 
outcome of charging countries with the highest growth rate (in 
principle developing countries) and entail risks of non acceptability or 
of dynamic inconsistency. Adaptative mandate circumvent this trap 
and comes back to a BLS type rule. However this rule applies to the 
total of second period expenditures and climate damages which 
complicates the matter for two reasons: first some countries might be 
hurt so much that they would not have to contribute at all to second 
period abatement expenditures; second the uncertainty of science 
about climate change at a regional level and about resulting economic 
impacts, is huge. 
Even though uncertainty (and its strategic use) does not affect the 
burden allocation at the first period, it changes significantly the 
magnitude of the first (and second period) effort depending upon 
Parties adopting a dynastic or universal solidarity. In the latter case, 
be for reasons of benevolence, of fear of propagation effects of local 
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shocks or of non confidence in climate change predictions at a local 
scale, part of damages expected to fall on a poor country is accounted 
by rich countries who have a higher weight in the planner’s objective 
function. This explains why, for given sets of ‘beliefs’ regarding 
climate change the problems related to uncertainty matter less under 
this mandate and why the optimal first period action is higher. 
This analysis suffers from a number of limitations, in particular 
because it only considers moves along a Pareto frontier; it examines 
neither the impact of income distribution of on the production frontier 
(Guesnerie, 1995) nor no-regret measures (Hourcade et al., 1996) 
allowing for what Stiglitz (1998) calls “near Pareto improvements”. In 
policy terms however it shows that controversies about equity does 
not prevent from agreeing on a simple rule of thumb (proportionality 
to per capita revenue) to allocate the costs of producing a global public 
good. But, and this is a strong assumption, this implies Parties to 
follow a “universal solidarity” attitude and the wealthiest ones to 
refrain from using their negotiating power to refuse envisaging the 
narrowing of gaps in per capita income over the century.  
A lot of work remains to be done to translate this rule of thumb 
through proxies based on observable variables. No such allocation  
mechanism may suffice in securing equity because of the uncertainty 
pervading all the parameters at stake and the focus should be placed 
on the institutional devices apt to face uncertainty (Hourcade and 
Ghersi, 2002). But, even within a rather conservative no redistribution 
principle, we provide a tool to assess the equitable character of various 
package deals and we show that attitudes regarding damages and 
future generations will ultimately matter more than “ethical 
intuitions.” 
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Appendix 1: Model Resolution under Certainty 
Under certainty, the most general version of the planner’s model is as 
follows: 
Max ∑
i
 li αi Ui(yi-ai)  + ϕ ∑
i
 lif βi Uif(yif-aif-di(x+xf),d1f,…,di-1f ,di+1f ,…,dNf ) 
 (a1) 
Under the following constraints: 
∑
i
 li ai = C(x) (a2) 
∑
i
 lif aif = Cf(xf) (a3) 
ai ≥ 0 (a4) 
aif ≥ 0 (a5) 
αi = 
α
Ui'(yi)
                                                   with α = 



∑
i
 
li
Ui'(yi)
 -1
 (a6) 
βi = 


   αi     in status-quo mandates
β
Ui f'(yif)
 in adaptative mandates      with β = 


∑
i
 
lif
U if'(yif)
 -1
 (a7) 
Let λ, µ, ξi and ψi be the Lagrange multipliers attached to 
constraints (a2) to (a5). The Lagrangean of the problem is: 
L = ∑
i
 li αi Ui(yi-ai) + ϕ ∑
i
 lif βi Uif(yif-aif-di(x+xf),d1f,…,di-1f ,di+1f ,…,dNf ) 
- λ[C(x) - ∑
i
 li ai] - µ ϕ [Cf(xf)-∑
i
 lif aif] - ∑
i
 li ξi ai - ϕ ∑
i
 lif ψi aif (a8) 
At optimum, derivation of L with regard to ai yields: 
∂L
∂ai = 0 ⇔ αi Ui
'(yi-ai) + ξi = λ  (a9) 
With 
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
ξi = 0 if ai > 0ξi > 0 if ai = 0 (a10) 
Since weighted marginal utilities of consumption before abatement 
are equal (a6), there is a solution where all first-period contributions to 
abatement ai are strictly positive, with corresponding Lagrange 
multipliers ξi equal to zero.21 
Derivation of L with regard to aif yields: 
∂L
∂aif = 0 ⇔ βi 
∂Uif
∂c  (yi
f-aif-di(x+xf),…) + ψi = µ (a11) 
In adaptative mandates, weights βi are such that weighted marginal 
utilities of consumption before abatement are equal. If damages are 
not too high in some countries, there again exists a solution where all 
abatement expenditures aif are positive, with Lagrange multipliers ψi 
equal to zero. If damages are too high in some countries, then 
constraint (a5) becomes binding, and the corresponding abatement 
expenditures are zero. 
In status-quo mandates on the contrary, weights βi are not likely to 
be such that the vector yif is welfare maximizing. In that case, the 
optimal plan is to allocate abatement expenditures to the country 
which has the lowest before abatement marginal utility of 
consumption. 
Derivation of L with regard to future abatement xf level yields: 
∂L
∂xf = 0 ⇔ µ C
f’(xf) = - ∑
i
 lif βi 
∂Uif
∂c  di
'(x+xf) - ∑
i
 lif βi ∑
j≠i
 
∂Uif
∂dj  dj
'(x+xf)  
             (a12) 
When none of the constraints (a5) are binding—i.e., in adaptative 
mandates when damages are not too high—(a11) tells us that 
Lagrange multiplier µ is equal to the (common) weighted marginal 
utility of consumption. In that case, (a12) can be simplified in: 
                                                 
21
 It is easy to demonstrate that this solution is superior to a solution where part, or all of 
the ai would be equal to zero. 
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Cf’(xf) = - ∑
i
 lif di'(x+xf) - ∑
i
 lif ∑
j≠i
 
∂Uif
∂c  


∂Uif
∂dj
 -1
dj'(x+xf) (a13) 
Abatement at second period should thus be such that it equates the 
sum of individual marginal damages, plus cross-country impacts, if 
any (in “universal solidarity” mandates). 
If, in adaptative mandates, damages in some countries are too high, 
then the weighted utility of the countries with high damages is higher 
than µ. The marginal damage in these countries is thus counted with a 
coefficient superior to 1. 
In status-quo mandates, on the other hand, µ is equal to the 
weighted marginal utility of the few countries which contribute to 
abatement expenditures. The weighted marginal utility of all the 
others is higher than that value, hence giving their marginal damages 
a higher weight in (a13). 
Derivation of L with regard to first-period abatement level x yields: 
∂L
∂x = 0 ⇔ λ C
’(x) = - ϕ ∑
i
 lif βi 
∂Uif
∂c  di
'(x+xf) - ϕ ∑
i
 lif βi ∑
j≠i
 
∂Uif
∂dj  dj
'(x+xf)  
             (a14) 
Since Lagrange multiplier λ is equal to the weighted marginal 
utility of consumption at first period, this equation can be written: 
C’(x) = - ϕ∑
i
 lif 
βi
αi
 
∂Uif
∂c  


dUi
dc
-1
di'(x+xf) - ϕ∑
i
 lif 
βi
αi
 ∑
j≠i
 
∂Uif
∂dj  


dUi
dc
-1
dj'(x+xf)   
 (a15) 
Let us first assume that weights αi and βi are equal (the status-quo 
mandate). Then the marginal cost of abatement at first period is equal 
the discounted sum of future marginal damages, weighted by the 
ratios in marginal utility of consumption at second and at first period. 
The country which marginal utility of consumption has decreased 
most, that is the country which bears all the abatement expenditures, 
also has the lowest weight on its marginal damage. Conversely, the 
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countries with the lowest decrease in marginal utility of consumption 
sees its marginal damages weighted higher. 
In the adaptative mandates, on the other hand, equation (a15)—
omitting the second term—becomes:  
C’(x) = - ϕ ∑
i
 lif 
Ui'(yi)
α
 
β
Ui f'(yif)
   
∂Uif
∂c  (yi
f-aif-di) 


dUi
dc (yi-ai)
-1
di'(x+xf) (a16) 
If total costs of climate change in all countries and at both periods 
remain small compared to baseline revenues, then the marginal utility 
terms cancel out, and remains:  
C’(x) = - ϕ β
α
 ∑
i
 lif di'(x+xf) (a17) 
The term ϕ β
α
 is approximately equal to the consumption discount 
rate in that economy. First period abatement costs are thus equal, in 
that case, to the discounted value of second period abatement costs. 
Appendix 2: Model Resolution under Uncertainty 
To introduce uncertainty, we assume the planner faces a finite set of 
possible scenarios indexed by j∈{1,2,…,M}. Each set is characterized 
by a specific distribution of climate change impacts dij, of regional 
second-period income yijf, and of future abatement costs Cjf. The 
planner also knows that full information about the true state of the 
world will be revealed at the beginning of second period. But at the 
beginning of the first period, the planner only has a set of subjective 
probabilities pj attached to each possible future state of the world. 
Assuming the planner’s utility function is Von-Neumann, the 
optimization problem becomes: 
Max ∑
i
 li αi Ui(yi-ai)   
+ ∑
j
 pj ϕ ∑
i
 lif βij Uif(yijf-aijf-dij(x+xjf),d1jf ,…,di-1 jf ,di+1 jf ,…,dNjf ) (a18) 
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∑
i
 li ai = C(x) (a19) 
∑
i
 lif aijf = Cjf(xjf) (a20) 
ai ≥ 0 (a21) 
aijf ≥ 0 (a22) 
αi = 
α
Ui'(yi)
                                                   with α = 



∑
i
 
1
Ui'(yi)
 -1
 (a23) 
βij = 


   αi     in status-quo mandates
βj
Ui f'(yijf)
 in adaptative mandates      with βj = 


∑
i
 
1
Ui'(yijf)
 -1
 (a24) 
The Lagrangean becomes 
L = ∑
i
 li αi Ui(yi-ai) + ϕ ∑
ij
 lif pj βij Uif(yijf-aijf-dij(x+xjf),d1jf ,…,di-1 jf ,di+1 jf
,…,dNjf ) - λ[C(x) - ∑
i
 li ai] - ∑
j
 pj µj ϕ [Cjf(xjf)-∑
i
 lif aijf] - ∑
i
 li ξi ai   
- ϕ ∑
ij
 lif ψij aijf (a25) 
And first-order conditions are now 
∂L
∂ai = 0 ⇔ αi Ui
'(yi-ai) + ξi = λ  (a26) 
∂L
∂aijf
 = 0 ⇔ βij ∂Ui
f
∂c  (yij
f-aijf-dij(x+xjf),…) + ψij = µj (a27) 
∂L
∂xjf
 = 0 ⇔ µj Cjf’(xjf) = - ∑
i
 lif βij 
∂Uif
∂c  dij
' (x+xjf)   - ∑
i
 lif βij ∑
k≠i
 
∂Ukf
∂dkj dkj
' (x+xjf)  
 (a28) 
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∂L
∂x = 0 ⇔ λ C
’(x) = - ∑
j
 pj ϕ ∑
i
 lif βij 
∂Uif
∂c  dij
' (x+xjf)  
                                 - ∑
j
 pj ϕ ∑
i
 lif βij ∑
k≠i
 
∂Ukf
∂dkj dkj
' (x+xjf) (a29) 
Appendix 3: Domain of Validity of Property (12)  
Let U be a twice differentiable utility function defined over ℝ+, with 
U'>0, U"<0.  We are looking for the conditions under which the 
following property is valid: 
(P1) For all x>0 and all y > 0,  x < y ⇒ U"(x)U'(x)  < 
U"(y)
U'(y) (a30) 
For property P1 to hold, U' be sufficiently convex.22 We show here 
that if U"/U' is monotonous, and if U is unbounded, then P1 holds. 
Proof: If U"/U' were decreasing, then we would have  
(U"/U')' =  [ln(U')]" ≤ 0 over [1,+∞[. 
Let G be the twice differentiable function such that G(1) = U'(1), 
[ln(G)]'(1) = [ln(U')]'(1), and [ln(G)]' constant over [1,+∞[.  G exists, and 
is uniquely defined. Precisely, G(c) = eac+b with a + b = U'(1) and a = 
[ln(U')]'(1) <0. 
Since G(1) = U'(1), [ln(G)]'(1) = [ln(U')]'(1), and [ln(U')]" ≤ 0 while 
[ln(G)]"=0, we have U'(c)  ≤ G(c) for all c in [1,+∞[. 
But ⌡⌠
 1
 c
G(x) dx is bounded, and thus so is ⌡⌠
 1
 c
U'(x) dx, which 
contradicts the initial assumption that U is not bounded. C.Q.F.D. 
 
 
 
                                                 
22
 In the literature on attitudes towards risk, P1 is equivalent to decreasing absolute risk 
aversion. 
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Appendix 4: 
Let U be a twice differentiable utility function defined over ℝ+, with 
U'>0, U"<0.  Let x1,…,xn,y1,…,yn be strictly positive real numbers with 
y1 > yi for all i ≥ 2. We want to explore under which conditions the 
following holds: 
(P2) 
U'(y1x1)
U'(x1)   < 
U'(yixi)
U'(xi)  for all i ≥ 2 (a31) 
This is true for all utility functions such that U'(ac) = a-k U'(c) with 
a>0 and k>0. That includes, in particular, classical utility functions 
such as ln(c), and ca with 0<a<1. 
For small growth, we have: 
U'(c(1+g))
U'(c)  ≈ 
U'(c) + U"(c)gc
U'(c)  = 1 + 
U"(c)
U'(c)cg (a32) 
Thus 
U'(c1(1+g1))
U'(c1)  < 
U'(c2(1+g2))
U'(c2)       i.i.f  - 
U"(c1)
U'(c1)c1 g1 > - 
U"(c2)
U'(c2)c2 g2 (a33) 
 
The property is valid when U"/U' is inversely proportional to 
wealth. In the other cases, the problem is more difficult. If the country 
to grow at faster rate is also the country with lowest initial wealth 
level (c1 < c2, g1 > g2), then the property is valid for functions where   
- c U"/U' is decreasing with wealth. When - c U"/U' is increasing with 
wealth, then the result is ambiguous.23 
Appendix 5: Numerical Illustration 
We consider two regions, called “North” and “South” respectively. 
“North” comprises high-income countries, as per World Bank (2002) 
definition, and “South” low and middle income ones. First period is 
                                                 
23
 In the literature on attitudes towards risk, - c U"/U' is the relative risk aversion. The 
property holds for constant relative risk aversion, and decreasing risk aversion functions. 
It is ambiguous for increasing risk aversion ones. 
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2000-2050, and second period 2050-2100. First-period income and 
population data are given by World Bank (2002).24 In the baseline 
scenario, economic growth in the North is assumed to be 2.5% per 
year, against 3% in the South. World population is assumed to grow 
by 2 billions people, all of them in the developing world. Table 2 
summarizes key economic parameters in the baseline scenario. 
Carbon dioxide emissions in the baseline assumed to reach 
500 GtCO2 during the first period, and 700 GtCO2 during the second 
one. Abatement costs at first and second period are assumed quadratic 
with respect to total abatement expenditures: 
x = 500 



1 - 3 
ln an + ls as
ln yn + ls ys  (a34) 
xf = 700 



1 - 6 
lnf  anf  + lsf  asf
lnf   ynf + lsf ysf
  (a35) 
Damages are assumed to be cubic with the total amount of carbon 
emitted in the atmosphere x+xf. We will use several sets of coefficients 
(θnorth,θsouth) to simulate several possible distribution of damages 
across countries. 
dif(x+xf) = θi 


x+xf
1200
 3
 (a36) 
All utility functions are assumed to be logarithmic in consumption. 
The utility discount rate is set at 1% per year. 
                                                 
24
 For simplicity’s sake, we use 2000 and 2050 data respectively as averages for the two 
periods. 
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Table 1: Second-Period Expenditures in Adaptative – Dynastic Mandates 
 
Scenario yN yS θN θS 
aN
yN    
dN
yN  
aN
yN 
+
dN
yN  
aS
yS   
dS
yS   
aS
yS +
dS
yS  
a 91.94 5.09 0.05 yN 0.05 yS 1.00% 1.18% 2.18% 1.00% 1.18% 2.18% 
b 91.94 5.09 0.04 yN 0.06 yS 1.08% 1.01% 2.09% 0.57% 1.52% 2.09% 
c 91.94 5.09 0.03 yN 0.07 yS 1.17% 0.82% 1.99% 0.08% 1.91% 1.99% 
d 91.94 5.09 0.02 yN 0.08 yS 1.09% 0.59% 1.68% 0% 2.38% 2.38% 
In scenario (a), climate change rips the same share of baseline revenue in the North and in the South (5% 
if no abatement occurs). Starting from scenario (b), damages as a share of baseline revenues become higher in 
the South than in the North, with respectively 4%/6%, 3%/7% and 2%/8% if no abatement occurs. 
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Table 2: Total Abatement Level in Adaptative Dynastic Mandate 
 
θN 
(% yNf ) 
θS 
(% ySf) 
Total 
Emissions 
x+xf 
Second-
Period 
Climate bill 
N 
Second-
Period 
Climate bill S 
a 5.0% 5.0% 743.4 2.20% 2.20% 
b 4.4% 6.4% 743.4 2.20% 2.20% 
c 3.9% 7.8% 743.4 2.20% 2.20% 
d 3.3% 9.1% 743.4 2.20% 2.20% 
e 2.7% 10.5% 742.8 2.08% 2.50% 
f 2.1% 11.9% 742.1 1.95% 2.83% 
g 1.6% 13.3% 741.2 1.81% 3.15% 
h 1.0% 14.7% 740.2 1.69% 3.45% 
i 0.4% 16.1% 739.2 1.56% 3.75% 
j 0.0% 17.0% 738.2 1.47% 3.97% 
In all scenarios, the total world damage is constant, and only its distribution varies in such a way that the 
population weighted marginal damage remains constant. In  scenarios a to d, damages are such that both 
north and south contribute at second period (see Appendix 3 for assumptions underlying this analysis). 
Total emissions x+xf are equal. From scenario e onward, damages are too high in the South, and climate bills 
relative to income can no longer be equalized. However, although the wedge between north and south 
damages rises sharply, total cumulative emissions x+xf decline only very little (less than one per cent). 
  33
Table 3: Economic and Population Assumptions 
 
 2000  2050  
 li (billions) yi (1995 US$) lif (billions) yif (1995 US$) 
North 0.95 26,750 0.95 91,943 
South 5.11 1,160 7.11 5,085 
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Figure 1: Optimal abatement levels for the poor and for the rich region at first period 
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Figure 2: Optimal abatement levels for the poor and for the rich region at second period 
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